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RAISE HIGH THE ROOF BEAM:
ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS, INC. V. PENA
AND THE
NEW LEVEL OF SCRUTINY FOR FEDERAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race.
There is no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally,
we must treat them differently.'
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court reviewed a significant Tenth Circuit decision during
the 1994-95 survey period: Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.2 Adarand ad-
dressed the issue of affirmative action;3 specifically, the level of scrutiny ap-
propriate for evaluating federal race-based programs. The Supreme Court va-
cated the Tenth Circuit's decision in Adarand and held that all racial classifi-
cations, whether imposed by federal, state, or local government, should be
subject to "strict scrutiny."4 This standard applies even if the program in ques-
tion has a benign purpose' and requires that all government affirmative action
programs' be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.,
The Adarand Court, however, failed to provide firm direction as to what
measures government entities should take in order to serve these interests.
This article traces the development of affirmative action jurisprudence and
attempts to provide guidance for practitioners litigating government affirmative
1. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring
in the judgment, and dissenting in part).
2. 16 F.3d 1537 (10th Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
3. Affirmative action programs are rooted in the assumption that employers hire workers
and contract for jobs within a framework reflecting long-standing patterns of discrimination and
prejudice. To correct the resulting imbalances, employers must consider race or sex by endeavor-
ing to hire and retain workers from groups which have suffered from past discrimination. Affirma-
tive action programs are necessary in public contracting to assure that contracts are awarded to
deserving parties, not merely favored ones. EQUAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES & SAN FRANCISCO
LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR URBAN AFFAIRS, THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION HANDBOOK: HOW TO
START AND DEFEND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS 1 (Judith Kurtz et al. eds., 1992) [hereinaf-
ter THE HANDBOOK].
4. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
5. See id. In the context of affirmative action, a "benign" purpose refers to a remedial goal,
such as attempting to remedy the effects of past discrimination, or to a non-remedial goal, where
role models are provided for minorities, or to promote diversity. Id.
6. The law surrounding affirmative action distinguishes between programs for private enti-
ties and those implemented by government. The Adarand decision applies only to government
employment. Courts require stricter standards for government employers than for private ones;
however, private entities still need to follow guidelines in enacting an affirmative action plan. For
practical guidance in this realm, see THE HANDBOOK, supra note 3; JAMES WALSH, MASTERING
DIVERSITY: MANAGING FOR SUCCESS UNDER ADA & OTHER ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS
(1995).
7. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117.
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action claims or advising government employers who wish to institute a per-
missible affirmative action plan in the wake of Adarand.
I. VOLUNTARY GOVERNMENTAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLANS'
The Supreme Court's struggle with the heated topic of affirmative action9
is apparent in the many plurality and majority opinions on this issue, which
reflect a chronic lack of consensus within the Court. The Adarand decision
represents a drastic change in the Court's treatment of affirmative action
law.'" In Adarand, the Court mandated that all racial classifications, whether
imposed by federal, state, or local government, be analyzed under a strict scru-
tiny standard." The ramifications of the decision are not yet clear. However,
because all race-conscious programs must now serve a compelling governmen-
tal need, Adarand threatens to extinguish all but the most narrowly and care-
fully crafted race-based state and federal affirmative action programs. 2
A. The Pre-Adarand History of Affirmative Action
The Court first treated the issue of affirmative action in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke. 3 Bakke involved an equal protection chal-
lenge to a state-run medical school's policy of reserving a certain number of
spaces in the enrolling class for minority applicants.' 4 Allan Bakke, a white
8. Affirmative action law is divided into two sectors: court-ordered and voluntary. This
article deals solely with voluntary plans. It should be noted that affirmative action is distinct from
a quota system, for which it is often mistaken. Quota programs reserve a set number or percentage
of positions for individuals in specific groups. The quota will be met whether or not the applicants
are properly qualified. Individuals who are not a member of a specific group are ineligible to
compete for reserved positions. Affirmative action plans, on the other hand, do not preclude any
individual from competing for a position, but instead seek to increase the number of minority ap-
plicants through recruitment and outreach programs. These programs seek to ensure that all quali-
fied job applicants are aware of employment possibilities. THE HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 2.
9. The issue of affirmative action compels a strong emotional response in many. For view-
points critical of affirmative action, see Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and
Social Engineers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1312 (1986); Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the
Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Martin
Schiff, Reverse Discrimination Re-Defined as Equal Protection: The Orwellian Nightmare in the
Enforcement of Civil Rights Laws, 8 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 627 (1985). For those speaking in
favor of affirmative action, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 1060 (1991); Frances L. Ansley, A Civil Rights Agenda for the Year 2000: Con-
fessions of An Identity Politician, 59 TENN. L. REV. 593 (1992); Paul Brest, The Supreme Court
1975 Term, Forward: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976);
John H. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Ctu. L. REV. 723
(1974).
10. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
11. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
12. Despite Justice O'Connor's contention in Adarand that the Court wished to dispel the
perception of strict scrutiny as "strict in theory, but fatal in fact," strict scrutiny is a formidable
obstacle. Id. at 2117. The last time that a majority of the Court upheld a race-based classification
under strict scrutiny was in 1944, in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). In that
decision, the Court voted 6-3 to uphold an executive order, borne of a fear of sabotage, to tempo-
rarily exclude persons of Japanese ancestry from certain areas. Id. at 215-24.
13. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
14. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 281. The admissions committee designated 16 places out of 100 for
which only minority applicants could be eligible. Id. at 275-76.
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male twice rejected by the University of California at Davis Medical School,
alleged that he would have been admitted to the school under the special
standards for minority admissions." Justice Powell, writing for a plurality,
ordered Bakke's admission to the program. 6 He rejected the university's con-
tention that discrimination against a white majority cannot be viewed as such
if it is remedial in nature. 7 He noted that classifications granting benefits on
the basis of race would instill resentment in the individuals "burdened,"' 8 and
stressed the "inherent unfairness" of depriving "innocent persons of equal
rights and opportunities."' 9 The Court, however, also ruled that race could be
a factor in the admissions process." While emphasizing that a diverse student
15. The university had a separate admissions committee largely composed of members of
minority groups. Id. at 274. If, in 1973, an applicant answered "yes" to questions indicating that
he wished to be considered "economically and/or educationally disadvantaged," or, in 1974, that
he wished to be considered as a member of a minority group, the application was sent to a special
admissions committee. Id. at 274-75. At this point, the application was screened to determine the
validity of the claim. Id. If the applicant was eligible for the special admissions program, he was
rated by a similar standard to the general admissions program, except that the grades of the special
applicants were not required to meet the general applicants' 2.5 grade point average cutoff. Id. at
275. The special committee presented its top candidates to the general committee until the number
of minority applicants that the faculty had agreed would be accepted were admitted. Id. at 274-75.
During the two years for which Bakke was denied admission to the medical school, minority
applicants were admitted who had significantly lower grades or Board scores than Bakke. Id. at
277.
16. Id. at 320.
17. Id. at 294. In so holding, Justice Powell first articulated a theme which would run
through later cases and prove pivotal in Adarand: that affirmative action programs, although be-
nign in purpose, have the impact of exacting discrimination against whites and must, therefore, be
subject to the same standards as classifications imposing traditional discrimination.
18. Id. at 295 n.34.
19. Id. Bakke makes apparent the concept of white "entitlement." Many commentators have
perceived this notion and its ramifications regarding affirmative action programs. As one
commentator critically commented, "Any remedy for past discrimination must not be too costly to
whites. So-called 'innocent' whites may not be made to pay the penalty for past injustices." Rich-
ard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fourth Chronicle: Neutrality and Stasis in Antidiscrimination Law, 45
STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1144 (1993). For another analysis of the concept of white "entitlement" in
Bakke and other decisions, see D. Marvin Jones, Darkness Made Visible: Law, Metaphor, and the
Racial Self, 82 GEO. L.J. 437, 486 (1993) (stating that the constitutional question in Bakke was
merely a ruse to strip minorities and their advocates of both the medical school's affirmative ac-
tion program and the true concept of affirmative action by redefining it to mean reverse discrimi-
nation); see also Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1709, 1767 (1993)
(noting the irony of the Court's use of the Equal Protection Clause to protect benefits for whites
with an eye toward their "established expectations," despite the Clause's original purpose: to se-
cure equality for African-Americans and renounce race-based and race-conscious measures as
unconstitutional).
20. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 296 n.36. The Court stated that race or ethnic background could be
"deemed a 'plus"' in the applicant's file, just as would any other traditional factors such as "ex-
ceptional personal talents, unique work or service experience, leadership potential" or "a life spent
on a farm." Id. at 316-17. One commentator stated:
Justice Powell here was deeply wrong; the daily experience of being a member of a
stigmatized minority is not equivalent to a summer job or an ability to play the pi-
ano .... Justice Powell reduced race to a plus factor in order to make it "fit in" with
the existing decision-making procedures of the university. Race is brought down to the
level of work experience because that is a level with which the institution is familiar;
race consciousness is only acceptable if it can be envisioned as a normal "factor" akin to
those used in the usual institutional procedures.
Adam Winkler, Sounds of Silence: The Supreme Court and Affirmative Action, 28 LoY. L.A. L.
REv. 923, 942-43 (1995).
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body was a sufficiently compelling goal for an institution of higher learn-
ing,2 the Court objected to the strict allotment of spaces by race.2 Notably,
the Court also found that remedying the disabling effects of identified prior
discrimination was a fitting justification for an affirmative action program, de-
spite the fact that the university did not present this argument.23
Two years after the Bakke decision, the Court revisited the issue of race-
based classifications in Fullilove v. Klutznick.24 Unlike Bakke, Fullilove in-
volved a federal program; namely, the "Minority Business Enterprise" (MBE)
provision of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977. In Fullilove, an
association of construction contractors and subcontractors instituted an action
seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the MBE.25 Writ-
ing for the plurality, Chief Justice Burger upheld the provision as an exercise
of Congress's spending power 6 and commerce power.27 The Court held that
"in no organ of government, state or federal, does there repose a more com-
prehensive remedial power than in the Congress."28
The Fullilove Court found that the MBE program was "narrowly tailored"
to accomplish Congress's goal of remedying past discrimination in public
works projects.29 Chief Justice Burger explicitly declined to apply a labeled
standard of review, saying instead that racial classifications must receive a
"most searching examination."3 ° He further noted that while the Court did not
adopt the standards from Bakke, the provision in question would survive re-
view under either test discussed in Bakke.3'
21. The Court in Bakke recognized diversity as a "compelling goal," despite the fact that it
did not uphold the program. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12, 314.
22. See id. at 311. The university attempted to distinguish their "special admissions" pro-
gram from a quota system by saying that no true number was set for minority acceptees. Id. at
288. The university asserted that it would not accept an unqualified applicant merely to meet a
quota, nor would it cap the number of minority students by limiting the number admitted under
general admission standards. Id. at 288 n.26. The Court called the distinction "semantic," stating
that whether termed a goal or quota, the program still amounted to a line drawn on the basis of
race or ethnicity. Id. at 289.
23. Id. at 307. The Court emphasized that racial and ethnic classifications must be "precisely
tailored to serve a compelling government interest," the exact definition of strict scrutiny. Id. at
299. Four Justices in Bakke (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackinun), however, argued for a less
stringent standard of review for racial classifications "designed to further remedial purposes." Id.
at 359. These Justices suggested intermediate scrutiny as the proper test for race-conscious reme-
dies. Id. at 362.
24. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). For an analysis of Fullilove, see Sofia Adrogue, When Injustice Is
the Game, What Is Fair Play?, 28 HoUs. L. REv. 363, 369-76 (1991); Drew S. Days, III,
Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453 (1987).
25. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 448, 455. The act required that, absent an administrative waiver,
states use at least 10% of the federal funds granted for local public works projects to procure
goods or services from minority owned businesses. Id. at 448.
26. Id. at 473-78.
27. Id. at 475-78.
28. Id. at 483. The Court further observed that Congress possesses "broad powers" to reme-
dy the results of past discrimination. Id. at 478. Congress also need not compile a record or pres-
ent findings; the Court was "well satisfied" that Congress had an "abundant historical basis" from
which to judge the existence of a nationwide problem. Id.
29. Id. at 487-88. The program provided for a waiver and exemption and was limited in ex-
tent and duration. Id.
30. Id. at491.
31. The program would, therefore, have been upheld under strict or intermediate review. Id.
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Several years later, in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,32 the
Court examined the types of past discrimination that could justify an affirma-
tive action program.3 The Court struck down a collective bargaining agree-
ment extending layoff protection to minority teachers, while denying the same
benefit to white teachers with more seniority. 4 The plurality reached this
decision by applying a strict scrutiny standard and finding that the school
board's goal of providing role models for minority students was not "narrowly
tailored" and did not meet a "compelling government interest."35
Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence in Wygant, agreed that remedying
"societal" discrimination did not constitute a compelling state interest. 6 She
then noted the detrimental effect of requiring illegal discrimination as a pre-
requisite to an affirmative action program.37 Such a requirement would se-
verely undermine government employers' incentive to voluntarily meet their
civil rights obligations. Finally, Justice O'Connor provided tangible guid-
ance as to what acts of prior discrimination would be sufficient to support the
enactment of an affirmative action program.39 She rejected the school board's
assertion that the difference between the number of minority students in the
school and the number of minority teachers employed by the school could be
evaluated for discriminatory practices.' Instead, she asserted that an "infer-
ence of deliberate discrimination in employment" is permissible only when the
proven availability of minorities in the relevant labor pool "substantially
exceeded those hired."'" Such an inference may provide a compelling basis
at 492. In a concurring opinion, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun repeated their assertion
in Bakke that intermediate scrutiny was the applicable level of review for a remedial program. Id.
at 519. Justices Stewart and Rehnquist dissented, arguing that the set-aside program was unconsti-
tutional. They asserted that the "Constitution is colorblind" and that the "decision is wrong for the
same reason that Plessy v. Ferguson was wrong." Id. at 522-23.
32. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
33. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 270. Once again, the Court failed to unite in a majority opinion. As
in Bakke, Justice Powell authored the plurality opinion. Id.
34. Id.
35. In fact, the Court said that the role-model objective, that black students are in a better
position when taught by black teachers, could actually work to legitimize discriminatory employ-
ment practices by encouraging the use of low African-American enrollment figures to justify a
"corresponding" dearth of African-American teachers. The Court further stated that the role-model
theory creates a situation analogous to that rejected in Brown v. Board of Education when "carried
to its logical extreme." Id. at 276.
First, the Court found that remedying societal discrimination did not amount to a compel-
ling government interest. "Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for
imposing a racially 'classified remedy." Id. at 276-78. Instead, Justice Powell insisted that the
particular institution implementing the affirmative action program must show that it committed
discrimination in the past to justify the layoff inequalities. Id. at 274-75. Second, the Court held
that the layoff plan was not narrowly tailored; less restrictive means were available to achieve the
same goal, so the program could not withstand strict scrutiny. Id. at 280 n.6. The Court, however,
carefully distinguished Wygant from cases which involved hirings: "though hiring goals may bur-
den some innocent individuals, they simply do not impose the same kind of injury that layoffs
impose." Id. at 282.




40. Id. at 294.
41. Id.
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for an employer to execute a voluntary affirmative action plan in order to
remedy discernible prior employment discrimination.42
In Richmond v. JA. Croson," the Court finally achieved a majority opin-
ion and determined that strict scrutiny provided the appropriate standard of
review when analyzing state and local government programs." Additionally,
the Court provided further insight into the type of statistical evidence of past
discrimination necessary to meet the "compelling government interest" stan-
dard.45 The city of Richmond, Virginia adopted a Minority Business Utili-
zation Plan requiring prime contractors to subcontract at least 30% of city
construction contracts to "Minority Business Enterprises."' The city argued
that the program was constitutional under the justifications expressed in
Fullilove 7 The Court held, however, that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires strict scrutiny of all race-based action by state
and local governments, without regard to the purpose of the statute.' Justice
O'Connor, writing for the majority, distinguished Fullilove as a federal pro-
gram, and thus exempt from strict scrutiny.49
Croson represented the first time that a majority of the Court agreed that
a race-based affirmative action measure must be evaluated under strict scruti-
ny. The Court held that while states and localities may take remedial action
upon a finding that their practices led to discrimination, they must also identi-
fy the discrimination with "some specificity" before adopting an affirmative
action program.0 The majority stated that the city failed to establish proof of
discrimination sufficient to constitute a compelling government interest.5 The
Court found that reliance on general past discrimination did not amount to a
compelling interest,52 and rejected the city's statistical argument that while
the city's population was over 50% black, minorities received only .67% of
the city's construction contracts. 3 As in Wygant, however, the Croson Court
was not without advice as to the type of statistical evidence relevant to a suc-
cessful claim of past discrimination. It stated that disparities between minority
participation in a particular industry and the percentage of minorities qualified
in the skills to compete in that industry could be probative of discrimination. 4
42. Id. at 292.
43. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). For an in-depth treatment of Croson, see Jennifer M. Bott, Affirma-
tive Action from Bakke to Croson: The Affirmative Action Quagmire and the D.C. Circuit's Ap-
proach to FCC Minority Preference Policies, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 845 (1990); Dianne E.
Dixon, The Dismantling of Affirmative Action Programs: Evaluating City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 7 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTs. 35 (1990); Kathleen M. Sullivan, City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co.: The Backlash Against Affirmative Action, 64 TUL. L. REv. 1609 (1990).
44. Croson, 488 U.S. at 499-500.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 469.
47. Id. at 489.
48. Id. at 490-91, 493-94.
49. Id. at 489.
50. Id. at 504.
51. Id. at 505.
52. Id. at 497-98.
53. Id. at 479-80, 499.
54. Id. at 501. The Court intimated that a proper statistical evaluation in this case would be a
comparison of the number of MBEs in Richmond qualified to accept city subcontracting work
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Justice O'Connor was careful to distinguish Fullilove from the similar
"set-aside" program in Croson by drawing heavily on the "unique remedial
powers of Congress."5 She noted that Congress, unlike the states, had a spe-
cific mandate to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 This enforcement
power incorporates the power to "define situations which Congress determines
threaten principles of equality and to adopt prophylactic rules to deal with
those situations."57 Thus, the Court's analysis in Croson turned on the nature
of the governmental body enacting the regulation.
In Croson, Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tice White, noted that congressionally enacted racial preferences raise discrete
issues," implying that the standard of review for a federal program differed
from that involving a state or local government. One year later, the Court gave
effect to this concept in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC.59 Metro Broadcast-
ing involved a challenge to a congressional mandate that the FCC give prefer-
ence to minorities when awarding licenses for radio and television stations.'
In this case, the Court applied an intermediate standard of review and held that
the FCC's minority preference policy did not violate the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment.6 The Court found "overriding signifi-
cance" in the fact that the programs were mandated by Congress." Further-
more, the Court found that benign race-conscious measures required by
with the percentage of city construction funds awarded to minority subcontractors. Id. at 502.
55. Id. at 488.
56. Id. at 490.
57. Id. The dissent in Croson found Richmond's set-aside program indistinguishable from
the program upheld in Fullilove. Id. at 535 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan &
Blackmun, JJ.). They argued for a more lenient standard of review, namely, the intermediate stan-
dard they had proposed in Bakke. Id. (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359). The dissent contended that
this intermediate standard was met in Croson by the city's twin objectives of "eradicating the
effects of past discrimination" and of "preventing [its] own spending decisions from reinforcing
and perpetuating the exclusionary effects" of the discrimination. Id. at 536-37. After considering
the evidence provided to the city council and Congress's findings as outlined in Fullilove, the
dissent, using the majority's own language, established the existence of a "'strong,' 'firm,' and
'unquestionably legitimate' basis upon which the city council could determine that the effects of
past racial discrimination warranted a remedial and prophylactic governmental response." Id. at
540.
58. Id. at 490.
59. 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). For an in-depth look at Met-
ro Broadcasting, see generally Michel Rosenfeld, Metro Broadcasting v. FCC: Affirmative Action
at the Crossroads of Constitutional Liberty and Equality, 38 UCLA L. REv. 583 (1991) (discuss-
ing the difficulty of reconciling previous affirmative action cases); Patricia Williams, Metro
Broadcasting v. FCC: Regrouping in Singular Times, 104 HARV. L. REv. 525 (1990).
60. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 552.
61. Id. at 564-65.
62. Id. at 563. The Court held that minority ownership policies were "substantially related"
to the achievement of a legitimate government interest in broadcasting diversity. Id. at 566. Justice
Brennan, relying on Fullilove, stated that the FCC policy did not constitute a quota and did not
impose an undue burden on nonminorities because the program involved only a limited number of
licenses. Id. at 598-99. Justice O'Connor, in her Metro Broadcasting dissent (and subsequently in
Adarand), contradicted her contention in Croson that congressional programs deserve to be distin-
guished from those administered by states and localities. She argued that, under Croson, strict
scrutiny must be applied to the FCC policy. Id. at 603 (O'Connor, J., Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia &
Kennedy, JJ., dissenting). She attacked remedial policies, such as the one in question, as endorsing
race-based reasoning and dividing the country into stigmatized groups, encouraging racial hostility
and conflict. Id. at 604.
19961
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Congress were constitutionally permissible even if not "'remedial' in the sense
of being designed to compensate victims of past governmental or societal dis-
crimination." ' This distinction was significant, as the Court ultimately recog-
nized broadcasting diversity as a compelling non-remedial goal. Although the
Court had previously recognized diversity as a compelling goal in Bakke,
Metro Broadcasting was the first, and only, affirmative action case in which
the court upheld a program seeking to promote a non-remedial goal.
B. Summary of the State of Affirmative Action Law Prior to Adarand
Before Adarand, the Court's focus was on the distinction between federal
and state programs. The Court had never before applied strict scrutiny to an
affirmative action program adopted by Congress or failed to uphold such a
program. Fullilove and Metro Broadcasting controlled Congressional actions;
Croson governed state and local programs. Federal programs received interme-
diate review; the Court subjected state and local programs to strict scrutiny.
The Court recognized that remedying the effects of past discrimination consti-
tuted a "compelling government interest," and acknowledged that a non-reme-
dial goal could meet that objective. The Bakke Court explicitly held that a di-
verse student body was a compelling goal for an institution of higher learn-
ing.' In Metro Broadcasting, when it upheld the FCC's goal of promoting
63. Id. at 564-65.
64. The Court has never overruled this concept, and under Bakke, diversity remains a com-
pelling interest in the setting of higher education. This holding, however, is in jeopardy due to
recent opinions emerging from the Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals. In Podberesky v.
Kirwan, the Fourth Circuit held that the University of Maryland denied a student of Hispanic and
white origin equal protection of the laws by denying him consideration for a scholarship open
only to African-American students. Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 153 (4th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 2001 (1995). The university maintained that the scholarship program was nec-
essary to combat the enduring effects of a long history of past discrimination against African-
American students. Id. at 152. The Fourth Circuit found evidence of present effects of past dis-
crimination at the university insufficient to support the program. Id. at 153-54. In necessitating
present effects, the circuit court is expanding the requirements; the Supreme court requires only a
finding of past discrimination to justify the application of a race-based measure. Id. The require-
ment of present effects had previously been advanced by Justice Scalia in his Croson concurrence.
Croson, 488 U.S. at 520. The Supreme Court denied certiorari, allowing the decision to stand, and
to be the controlling standard in the Fourth Circuit.
The Fifth Circuit, in Hopwood v. Texas, invalidated the University of Texas' Law School
admissions program, which provided for special admissions standards for minorities. Hopwood v.
Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 934 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, No. 95-1773, 1996 WL 227009 (U.S. July
1, 1996). The court denied that Bakke controlled the issue, and instead relied on Adarand. Id. at
944. In doing so, the court reviewed the program under a strict scrutiny standard and held that the
need for diversity in a university student body can never be a compelling reason to impose racial
classifications. Id. at 948. The Hopwood court held that race can never be used as a factor in
admissions, not even as the "plus" factor enunciated in Bakke, Id. While the use of race was not
permitted, a university
may properly favor one applicant over another because of his ability to play the cello,
make a downfield tackle, or understand chaos theory. An admissions process may also
consider an applicant's home state or relationship to school alumni .... Schools may
even consider factors such as whether an applicant's parents attended college or the
applicant's economic and social background.
Id. at 946. The university has decided that the ruling applies not only to admissions, but to finan-
cial aid, scholarships, and fellowships. Renae Merle, Morales: On Hopwood, Wait for the Court,
DAILY TEXAN, Apr. 9, 1996, at 1. On July 1, 1996, the United States Supreme Court denied cer-
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broadcasting diversity, the Court recognized diversity as an important govern-
ment interest.65 The Court did not explicitly address, however, whether the
concept of diversity as a constitutionally permissible goal of an affirmative
action plan reaches beyond the context of the broadcasting and university set-
tings.
II. ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS, INC. V. PENA66
A. Facts and Procedural History
The Small Business Act (SBA) provides government contractors with
financial incentives to employ "disadvantaged business enterprises" (DBEs) as
subcontractors. According to § 637(d) of the SBA, a DBE is at least 51%
owned and controlled by individuals who are socially and economically disad-
vantaged.67 Members of certain minority racial and ethnic groups, s as well
as women, are presumed socially and economically disadvantaged.'
In accordance with the Act, the Federal Lands Highway Program (FLHP)
effected the Subcontracting Compensation Clause (SCC), which provided
contractors with an incentive payment of up to 1.5% of the original contract
value if they hired DBE subcontractors.7" FLHP awarded Mountain Gravel
Construction Company (Mountain Gravel) a federal highway contract.7
Adarand Constructors, Inc. (Adarand), a white-owned subcontractor, not recog-
nized as a DBE, applied to build the guard rail portion of the project. 2
Mountain Gravel chose a subcontractor who submitted a higher bid but was a
certified DBE, thereby entitling Mountain Gravel to a $10,000 incentive pay-
ment.
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Adarand sued the government, asserting that the FLHP's policy of offer-
ing financial incentives to contractors who hired DBE subcontractors violated
the Equal Protection Clause.74 The United States District Court for the
tiorari, thereby declining the opportunity to reconsider the Bakke decision, at least for now.
65. Because the Metro Broadcasting Court upheld the legitimacy of the goal of broadcast
diversity under the intermediate standard, it remains unsettled whether this is a "compelling goal"
under strict scrutiny.
66. 16 F.3d 1537 (10th Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 637(d) (1994). The act defines socially disadvantaged individuals as "those
who have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias because of their identity as a
member of a group without regard to their individual qualities." Id. § 637 (a)(5). "Economically
disadvantaged individuals are those socially disadvantaged individuals whose ability to compete in
the free enterprise system has been impaired due to diminished capital and credit opportunities as
compared to others in the same business area who are not socially disadvantaged." Id. § 637
(a)(6)(A).
68. These socially and economically disadvantaged individuals include: "Black Americans,
Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities." Id. §
637(d)(3)(c) (1994).
69. This presumption is rebuttable under DBE criteria. See Adarand, 16 F.3d at 1541.
70. Id. at 1540.
71. Id. at 1541.
72. Id. at 1542.
73. Id. at 1541-42.
74. Id. at 1542.
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District of Colorado granted summary judgment in favor of the government,
and Adarand appealed.75
B. Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit unanimously affirmed the lower court's decision, hold-
ing the challenged policy constitutional.76 The court relied on Fullilove77 to
support its decision, citing Fullilove for the proposition that Congress properly
acts within its "broad powers under the Commerce Clause and § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment when it imposes an affirmative action program to
remedy nationwide discrimination in the construction industry.""
The court held that, under Fullilove, courts "must apply a lenient standard,
resembling intermediate scrutiny" to federal affirmative action programs. 9 It
was careful to distinguish Croson's application of the "strict scrutiny" standard
for state and local programs."0
The Court of Appeals found significance in the fact that the challenged
program did not require contractors to participate in the program and did not
set precise DBE goals.8 ' Rather, the contractor had the "option, not the obli-
gation" to choose a DBE subcontractor.82 Because the "program induces,
rather than compels" contractors to select DBE subcontractors, the court found
that it did not violate equal protection.83
C. Supreme Court Decision4
1. Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the
Tenth Circuit.85 Although the Court did not dismantle the challenged
75. Id. at 1539, 1542. The district court rejected Adarand's argument that the program must
be subjected to strict scrutiny under the standards set out in Croson, and held that Metro Broad-
casting and Fullilove should control. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Skinner, 790 F. Supp. 240, 244
(D. Colo. 1992). The court found that in Adarand, as in Fullilove, Congress had "abundant his-
torical basis" to support the challenged program. Id. The district court also found the program
sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve Congress's important objectives. Id.
76. Adarand, 16 F.3d at 1547.
77. Id. at 1543 (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)); see discussion supra
notes 24-31 and corresponding text.
78. Adarand, 16 F.3d at 1543-44.
79. Id. at 1544. The court recognized that Metro Broadcasting also called for intermediate
scrutiny of federal programs. Id. at 1545 n.12.
80. Id. at 1545 ("The lesson that we glean from Fullilove and Croson is that the federal
government, acting under congressional authority, can engage more freely in affirmative action
than states and localities.").
81. Id. at 1547.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
85. Justice O'Connor filed the opinion joined by Justice Kennedy; Justices Scalia and
Thomas filed opinions concurring in part and concurring in the judgment; Justice Stevens filed a
dissenting opinion in which Justice Ginsburg joined; Justice Souter filed a dissenting opinion in
which Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined; Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion in which
Justice Breyer joined.
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program, the decision clearly leveled an overwhelming blow to federal affir-
mative action programs. The Court held that all racial classifications, whether
imposed by federal, state, or local government, must be analyzed under a strict
scrutiny standard.86 In doing so, the Court relied heavily on its decision in
Richmond v. J.A. Croson, extending the standard it adopted for states and
localities to the federal government. 7
The Court began the opinion with a review of its decisions leading up to
Adarand. As previously discussed, the Court in Croson8" held that the Four-
teenth Amendment requires strict scrutiny of all raced-based action by state
and local governments. While conceding that Croson did not determine the
level of review required by the Fifth Amendment for federal race-based action,
the Adarand Court held that certain tenets relating to this issue had been pre-
viously decided by the Court in the cases leading up to Croson:89
First, skepticism: "[a]ny preference based on racial or ethnic criteria
must necessarily receive a most searching examination," . . .
[s]econd, consistency: "the standard of review under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or
benefited by a particular classification," 9 1.. , third, congruence:
"[e]qual protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same
as that under the Fourteenth Amendment.
92
The Court merged these three propositions and concluded that any person, re-
gardless of race, who is exposed to inequality by a government classification
based on race is entitled to have the government substantiate this classification
under strict scrutiny.93
The Court then addressed the previous case inconsistent with the new
standard enunciated in Adarand: Metro Broadcasting v. FCC.94 Faced with a
directly opposing opinion, the Adarand Court decided that Metro
Broadcasting's analysis was flawed.95 Attacking its own opinion, penned
merely five years earlier, the Court found that Metro Broadcasting erroneously
rejected Croson's insistence that strict scrutiny review of government classifi-
cations is necessary.96 Furthermore, the Court faulted Metro Broadcasting for
86. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
87. See supra notes 43-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of Croson.
88. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
89. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
90. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
273 (1986)).
91. Id. (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 494).
92. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976)).
93. Id.
94. 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (upholding two federal race-based policies against an Equal Pro-
tection challenge by stating that congressionally mandated benign classifications are subject to
intermediate scrutiny), overruled by 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). For a full discussion of Metro Broad-
casting, see supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
95. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111-13.
96. Id. at 2112 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493) ("Absent searching judicial inquiry into
the justification for such race-based measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifi-
cations are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate
notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics."). While Justice O'Connor expounds on this
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rejecting the tenet that "congruence" should exist between the criteria relevant
to "federal and state racial classifications.
'97
To the Adarand majority, Metro Broadcasting undermined the principle
that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments exist to "protect persons, not
groups."'98 The Adarand Court concluded that strict scrutiny should thus be
required for all group classifications, including race, whether imposed by state,
local, or federal government." The Court then explicitly overruled Metro
Broadcasting to the extent that the case is inconsistent with the Adarand hold-
ing.10
°
The Court in Adarand declared that all "federal racial classifications," like
state and local classifications, "must serve a compelling government interest
and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest."'' Although the Court
refused to concede that Fullilove called for a standard below strict scrutiny, it
eliminated any potential ambiguity by stating that if Fullilove held those clas-
sifications to a less rigid standard, "it no longer controll[ed]."'
The majority maintained that the strict scrutiny standard of review guaran-
tees that courts will consistently give racial classifications careful examina-
tion. ' 3 The Court tempered this, however, by asserting that it wished to
eliminate the perception that "strict scrutiny is strict in theory, fatal in
fact."' The Court concluded by remanding the case to the Tenth Circuit for
further consideration, in light of the fact that Adarand "alters the playing field
in some important respects."'0 5 Specifically, the Tenth Circuit had not ad-
dressed whether the interests served by the subcontracting compensation claus-
es were compelling and whether the program was sufficiently narrowly tai-
lored."°6
2. Concurring Opinions
Justice Scalia concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He depart-
ed from the majority, however, by arguing that the government never possess-
es a "compelling" interest in classifying individuals on the basis of race in
order to "make up" for a discriminatory past."
Justice Thomas also concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He
agreed with the majority's conclusion that strict scrutiny applies to all race-
theory at length in Adarand, she touches on it only briefly in Croson. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
97. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111-13.
98. Id. at 2112.
99. Id. at 2113.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2117.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring)).
105. Id. at 2118.
106. Id.
107. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia contended that a system of racial entitlement,
even with noble purposes, "reinforce[s] and preserve[s] for future mischief the way of thinking
that produced race slavery, race privilege, and race hatred." Id. at 2119.
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based governmental classifications.ta He wrote separately, however, to at-
tack Justice Stevens's and Justice Ginsburg's dissents, which in his view main-
tained "a racial paternalism exception to the principle of equal protection."'
Justice Thomas argued that laws intending to oppress a race and those intend-
ing to provide "benefits on the basis of race" are of "moral and constitutional
equivalence.'" 0
3. Dissenting Opinions
Justice Stevens authored a dissent, in which Justice Ginsburg joined. Jus-
tice Stevens stated that, "instead of deciding this case in accordance with
controlling precedent, the Court today delivers a disconcerting lecture about
the evils of governmental racial classifications."''. He rejected the majority's
notion that no "meaningful difference" exists between the determination to
place a special burden on a minority and the determination to confer a benefit
upon individual members of a minority." 2 Stevens argued that no "moral or
constitutional equivalence" exists between the concepts of discrimination and
affirmative action." 3 He accused the Court of adopting a policy which
"would disregard the difference between a 'No Trespassing' sign and a wel-
come mat;" one which would fail to see the disparity between a policy that
rendered "black citizens ineligible for military service" and one intended to
recruit black servicemen."4
Justice Stevens next attacked the majority's concept of "congruence,"
asserting that it overlooked fundamental differences between the legislative
bodies enacting the programs. ' 5  He argued that Metro Broadcasting,
Fullilove, and Croson all raise crucial differences between federal and state
programs, ' and questioned the Court's silence as to the "sudden and enor-
mous departure from the reasoning in past cases."
' 1 7
108. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
109. Id.
110. Id. Affirmative action programs, he averred, "stamp minorities with a badge of inferiori-
ty" and may induce them to believe "that they are 'entitled' to preferences." Id. Finally, he termed
"discrimination based on benign prejudice ... just as noxious as discrimination inspired by mali-
cious prejudice." Id.
111. Id. at 2120 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. Id.
113. Id. He argued that the two reflect competing impulses; one seeks to foster a class struc-
ture, the other equality. Id.
114. Id. at 2121. Justice Stevens seemed to subtly ridicule the majority's contention that
courts will not be able to differentiate between "invidious" and "benign" discrimination: "But the
term 'affirmative action' is common and well-understood. Its presence in everyday parlance shows
that people understand the difference between good intentions and bad." Id. He also admonished
the majority's holding that remedial classifications and discrimination are equivalent and should
not be upheld "in the name of 'equal protection."' Id. at 2122.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2124.
117. Id. at 2125. Justice Stevens further criticized the majority's failure to adhere to stare
decisis in its treatment of Fullilove and Metro Broadcasting, saying that the majority ignored the
power of binding precedent. Id. at 2131. He noted that Metro Broadcasting was overruled only as
far as its use of intermediate scrutiny, and, therefore, its holding that diversity may constitute a
sufficient government interest to warrant a nonremedial race-based program remains in force. Id.
at 2127.
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Justice Souter wrote a second dissent, and was joined by Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer. Justice Souter argued that stare decisis compels adher-
ence to Fullilove."8 Additionally, he observed that the majority opinion in
Adarand does not suggest a real change in the Court's traditional view of
Congress's § 5 powers as "broad," "unique," and "unlike [those of] any state
or political subdivision."'' 9
Justice Ginsburg authored the third dissent, joined by Justice Breyer. She
argued that since Congress was already handling the subject of affirmative ac-
tion, no compelling reason existed for the Court's intervention on the is-
sue. 20 Justice Ginsburg agreed with Justice Stevens's contention that Con-
gress deserves great deference from the judiciary. Additionally, she recounted
the long history of discrimination against racial minorities in this country.'2'
4. Analysis
Adarand radically alters the landscape of affirmative action law. Prior to
this decision, the Court had never before applied strict scrutiny to a remedial
race-conscious program adopted by Congress. By requiring strict scrutiny
review for all racial classifications imposed by federal, state, or local govern-
ments, the decision promises to end all but the most "narrowly tailored" feder-
al, state, and local affirmative action programs.
Perhaps the most disturbing facet of the Court's decision is the guise
under which the Court imposed its mandate. The Court asserted that strict
scrutiny is necessary because only under such heightened review does it be-
come clear whether the program in question seeks to advance minorities or op-
press them. In Adarand, the Court constructively terminated a policy designed
to foster equality, while attempting to do so in a favorable light, with fairness
as its guiding principle. As the dissent recognized, however, the majority's
sudden concern for a lower court's inability to differentiate between good and
bad intentions is little more than a transparent pretext with which to put an
end to all race-based measures.
The Court erred in several other respects by vacating the Tenth Circuit's
decision. First, the Court adopted the theory of "congruence," asserting that
equal protection analysis should be identical under either the Fifth or the Four-
teenth Amendment. In doing so, it ignored the fundamental difference between
the federal government and the states; a distinction which previous Courts had
outlined so laboriously.'22
118. Id. at 2132 (Souter, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 2133.
120. Id. at 2134 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice Ginsburg noted that she would
not interfere with the programs at issue in Adarand, and "would leave their improvement to the
political branches." Id. at 2136.
121. Id. ("Congress surely can condone that a carefully designed affirmative action program
may help realize, finally, the 'equal protection of the laws' the Fourteenth Amendment has prom-
ised since 1868.").
122. Id. at 2127 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Although members of today's majority trumpeted
the importance of that [federal-state dichotomy] distinction in Croson, they now reject it in the
name of 'congruence."'). Justice Stevens makes a valid point: in Croson, as in Adarand, Justice
Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist were aligned with Justice O'Connor, who, in authoring Croson,
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In fact, throughout Adarand's majority opinion, Justice O'Connor flatly
contradicts what she previously stated in Croson. In Croson, she relied upon
the distinction between Congress and state governments in holding that state
programs should be subject to a strict scrutiny standard: "What appellant ig-
nores is that Congress, unlike any State or political subdivision, has a specific
Constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."" 3 Additionally, her Croson opinion relied heavily on Chief Justice
Burger's Fullilove opinion, expounding at length on Congress's competence to
properly employ race-conscious remedial relief.'24 In failing to distinguish
the congressional program at issue in Adarand from the city program in
Croson, Justice O'Connor abandons a principle fundamental to constitutional
jurisprudence: the distinction between state and federal government.
Congressional programs should be treated differently than those adopted
by states and localities. Congress merits appropriate deference from the judi-
ciary as to race-based measures because of its "specifically delegated pow-
ers."' " Congress derives its authority from several sources. First, Congress
possesses "institutional competence as the National Legislature."'26 The Con-
stitution also grants Congress powers through the Spending Clause, 2' the
Commerce Clause,'28 and the enforcement clauses of the Civil War Amend-
ments.'29 Furthermore, Congress is a co-equal branch, and the Court is
bound to give Congress's decisions "great weight."'30 These powers justify
judicial deference to measures adopted by Congress that are not granted to
those designated by states or localities.
The Court further erred in asserting that, by overruling Metro Broadcast-
ing, it was not making new law, but merely restoring the law to its former
status. In Fullilove, prior to Metro Broadcasting, the Court spoke on the
had focused on the difference between state and federal programs. Justice Rehnquist did not write
a separate opinion in either case. Justice Scalia, concurring in the Croson judgment, wrote, "A
sound distinction between federal and state (or local) action based on race rests not only upon the
substance of the Civil War Amendments, but upon social reality and governmental theory."
Croson, 488 U.S. at 522. Kennedy, on the other hand, while concurring in the judgment, stated
that congressional programs should be subject to strict scrutiny:
The process by which a law that is an equal protection violation when it is enacted by a
state becomes transformed to an equal protection guarantee when enacted by Congress
poses a difficult proposition for me; but as it is not before us, any reconsideration of that
issue must await some further case.
Id. at 518.
123. Croson, 488 U.S. at 490.
124. Id. at 487-88.
125. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 473.
126. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 563.
127. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 474.
128. Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution provides Congress with authority to
"regulate any activity that has a 'real and substantial relation to the national interest.' Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255 (1964).
129. These Amendments "worked a dramatic change in the balance between congressional
and state power over matters of race .... 'They were intended to be what they really are, limita-
tions of the powers of the States and enlargements of the power of Congress."' Croson, 488 U.S.
at 490 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880)).
130. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472.
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question of the applicable standard of review for a federal affirmative action
program and specifically chose not to apply strict scrutiny.
Although the Fullilove Court chose not to impose a label on the standard
employed, it upheld a program on a standard plainly less severe than strict
scrutiny;13 1 in fact, Justice Burger took great pains to avoid the term.132 By
denying that Adarand represents a vast departure from existing law, the Court
indulges in a flimsy rationalization for a result-driven opinion.
III. PRACTICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF ADARAND
A. Introduction
Adarand promises to have far-reaching repercussions. While the Clinton
administration publicly lauded affirnative action in the weeks following
Adarand, 3 the administration simultaneously called for an immediate review
of all federal agencies to ensure compliance with the Adarand standard.'34
Deval Patrick, the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, has indicated
that some federal affirmative action plans "will have to end and others will
have to be reformed" due to Adarand's stricter standards.,35
It is unclear whether Adarand threatens all federal race-based programs.
Although the strict scrutiny standard will make it significantly more difficult
for race-conscious programs to survive, Justice O'Connor left open a window
of hope in Adarand. She explicitly acknowledged the need for race-conscious
programs by stating that "[tihe unhappy persistence of both the practice and
131. The Metro Broadcasting Court confirmed this: "A majority of the Court in Fullilove did
not apply strict scrutiny to the race-based classification at issue." Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at
564.
132. In fact, Justice O'Connor herself explicitly recognized this fact in Croson: "The principal
opinion in Fullilove, written by Chief Justice Burger, did not employ 'strict scrutiny' or any other
traditional standard of equal protection review." Croson, 488 U.S. at 487. Justice Burger merely
found that racial preferences must receive a "most searching examination." He did not name strict
scrutiny; in fact, he rejected it, saying, "This opinion does not adopt, either expressly or implicitly,
the formulas of analysis articulated in such cases as University of California Regents v. Bakke."
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 492.
133. "[T]he federal Government will continue to support lawful consideration of race, ethnici-
ty, and gender under programs that are flexible, realistic, subject to reevaluation, and fair." Presi-
dent Clinton's Memorandum on Affirmative Action, July 19, 1995, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
147, at D42 (Aug. 1, 1995).
134. Id. For a comprehensive list of all congressional race-based programs, see Congressional
Research Service's Compilation and Overview of Federal Laws and Regulations Establishing
Affirmative Action Goals, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at D25 (Feb. 23, 1995).
135. Affirmative Action: Some Programs Will Fail the Adarand Test, Patrick Tells House
Oversight Panel, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 140, at D3, 1 (July 21, 1995). The Department of
Justice has been hard at work to adjust federal affirmative action programs in compliance with
Adarand. Less than a year after Adarand, the Department of Justice has already published propos-
als to reform affirmative action in federal procurement which conform to the standards outlined in
Adarand. See Justice Department Proposed Reform to Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 100, at D22 (May 23, 1996). The Justice Department has also com-
piled an impressive list of studies and statistics on racial discrimination of minority-owned busi-
nesses which provide evidence that federal programs are justified under the compelling interest
test. See Justice Department Appendix on the Compelling Interest for Affirmative Action in Feder-
al Procurement: A Preliminary Survey, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 100, at D23 (May 23, 1996).
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lingering effects of racial discrimination" in this country will sometimes justify
a narrowly tailored race-based remedy.
3 6
The question remains, however, as to what exactly constitutes a "compel-
ling" governmental interest and what internal checks a program must possess
to be viewed as "narrowly tailored." Although the Adarand Court did not
provide explicit guidance, direction is available from precedent. Croson is
perhaps the best resource, as the Adarand Court relied heavily upon its rea-
soning. Additionally, Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Wygant provides
practical advice for public employers. 37
B. The "Compelling Interest" Requirement
In order for a government affirmative action program to meet the compel-
ling interest standard, the government employer must demonstrate that the plan
addresses ongoing discrimination, or that effects of past discrimination are
shown by particularized findings.'38 Statistical evidence, therefore, may be
the only acceptable verification of discrimination.'39
Clearly, generalized societal discrimination is not a sufficient justification
for an affirmative action plan."4 For example, a government employer can-
not justify an affinative action plan on the foundation that discrimination is a
pervasive problem in the United States. Evidence of nationwide discrimination
in a particular industry is similarly insufficient to justify a state or local pro-
gram; the discrimination must be linked to the local industry. 4' In the case
of a federal program, however, evidence of nationwide discrimination may still
be sufficient.
An industry is not required to hire minorities in proportion to the repre-
sentation of the minority in the general population. 42 Instead, the statistics
must reflect the number of minorities in the relevant population with the skills
required to perform the job.'43 The analysis, therefore, hinges on the dispari-
ty between the number of qualified minorities in the relevant population and
the number employed by the specific government entity.'" In certain em-
ployment contexts, such as those involving entry level positions or positions
requiring little training, disparities between the number of minorities in a
136. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117.
137. See discussion supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
138. Croson, 488 U.S. at 504.
139. Id. at 501-03 (calling for statistical evidence to support discrimination in the work force).
140. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276.
141. Croson, 488 U.S. at 504. If the program in question is enacted by a state or local gov-
ernment, the statistical evidence must be specific to the local industry. The Croson Court chastised
the city for relying on congressional findings of nationwide discrimination in the industry rather
than statistics reflecting the local industry. Id.
142. In Croson, evidence that while the city's population was over 50% minority, minority
businesses received only 0.67% of the city's prime contracts, was not adequate in the Court's eyes
to demonstrate discrimination. Id. at 501.
143. Id.
144. d. at 501-02.
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particular field and those in the general population may be probative of a
pattern of discrimination. 5
The requirement of a disparity between the number of qualified minorities
in the relevant pool and the number of minorities hired is somewhat flawed by
failing to account for one of the critical effects of discrimination. Discrimi-
nation is a pervasive problem to the extent that it virtually precludes participa-
tion of minorities in certain industries. Discrimination, therefore, can clearly
still exist even if the number of qualified minority participants in an industry
was proportional to the number hired. Croson left unanswered the question of
whether a government may provide evidence that the number of minorities
participating in a particular field would have been greater had it not been for
historical patterns of discrimination. The trend in lower courts has been to
allow reliance upon such evidence."
The issue remains open as to whether affirmative action may be used for
non-remedial objectives. The program at issue in Adarand was determined to
be remedial, in that it sought to redress the effects of past discrimination, and
thus did not lead the Court to address this issue. Justice Stevens, however, in
his Adarand dissent, maintained that the concept of promoting diversity is
consistent with the majority's opinion in Adarand.47 While the majority
overruled Metro Broadcasting on other grounds, the holding that diversity
constituted a significant government interest remains intact."4u Additionally,
the Court in Bakke identified a diverse student body as a compelling interest
for a university. 49 It is unclear, however, whether the concept of diversity as
a compelling interest extends beyond the unique environment of a university.
Because Metro Broadcasting was decided under the intermediate scrutiny
standard, broadcast diversity was found to satisfy only an important govern-
ment interest. 5 ' The compelling government interest in diversity outside of
the university or broadcasting contexts remains unclear.
C. The "Narrowly Tailored" Requirement
In order to satisfy the strict scrutiny standard, the affirmative action pro-
gram must also be "narrowly tailored." The Court has not set forth specific
standards to advise employers how to narrowly tailor their affirmative action
programs. The following factors, derived from several Supreme Court opin-
ions, offer some assistance in assessing whether a program is "narrowly tai-
lored."
One important aspect of a narrowly tailored program involves whether the
government considered race-neutral means before adopting the affirmative
action program.' Other determinants include the flexibility and duration of
145. Id.
146. Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger, Justice Department Memorandum on Su-
preme Court's Adarand Decision, Daily Lab. Rep. BNA) No. 125, at D33, 14 (June 29, 1995).
147. Id.
148. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2127-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313.
150. See discussion supra note 59-65 and accompanying text.
151. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507. Examples of race-neutral measures suggested by the Court
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the plan,'52 regular assessment and reevaluation procedures,'53 the scope of
the program, 54 and the availability of waiver provisions.'55 Additionally,
the reasonableness of a numerical goal in light of the number of qualified
minorities in the industry is pivotal in determining whether a program meets
the narrow tailoring requirement. 5 6 Finally, courts will consider the effect of
the program on third parties."'
CONCLUSION
The Adarand decision is disturbing on a number of levels. Perhaps most
distressing is the Court's dismissal of the good will and race-consciousness
inherent in enacting an affirmative action program. The assertion that strict
scrutiny is necessary to determine the injurious or beneficial nature of an
affirmative action program undercuts the competency of Congress, as well as
that of every court in the land.
Affirmative action was just one of a calculated list of political statements
issued this term by the conservative Court. Like Adarand, the two other cases
involving race and decided by the Court this term severely limited the
government's ability to provide measures to promote racial equality.' By
ignoring precedent and requiring strict scrutiny for congressionally mandated
include "[slimplification of bidding procedures, relaxation of bonding requirements, and training
and financial aid for disadvantaged entrepreneurs of all races." Id. at 509-10; see also United
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 ("In determining whether race-conscious remedies are appro-
priate, we look to several factors, including the efficacy of alternative remedies."); Wygant, 476
U.S. at 280 n.6 (stating that governments must consider "lawful alternative[s] and less restrictive
means" and citing the theory that the racial classification should "fit" more closely than other
available measures).
152. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 170; see also Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 513 (stating that the "tempo-
rary nature of this remedy ensures that a race-conscious program will not last longer than the
discriminatory effects it is designed to eliminate") (Powell, J., concurring); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 374
(noting that the medical school's strict allotment of 16% of the spaces in the class for minority
applicants was too rigid).
153. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 513.
154. The Wygant Court found that random inclusion of certain minority groups "further illus-
trates the undifferentiated nature of the plan." Wygant, 476 U.S. at 284, n.13. In Croson, the Court
criticized the "gross overinclusiveness" of Richmond's racial categories. The district court took
judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of minority individuals in Richmond were African-
American. Despite this, the plan included Spanish-speaking, Asian-American, Indian, Eskimo, and
Aleut individuals. Croson, 488 U.S. at 506.
155. See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171 (enumerating the availability of waiver provisions among
a list of factors contributing to the narrow tailoring requirement); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 488 (not-
ing the significance of Congress's allowance for administrative waiver and exemption, given a
showing that the level of minority participation cannot be reached while still maintaining the goals
of the program).
156. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171.
157. Id. The Court has historically frowned on programs which it felt placed heavy burdens
on nonminorities. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310 (holding that none of the interests offered by the
university could justify a plan which completely prevented nonminorities from competing for a
specific number of positions); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 282 (holding that layoff provision imposed too
great an injury to nonminorities).
158. Jeffery Rosen, The Color-Blind Court, NEW REPUBLIC, July 31, 1995, at 19. Miller v.
Johnson called into question the Voting Rights Act by holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits states from employing race as the "predominant purpose" in apportioning voting districts.
Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995). Missouri v. Jenkins constrained the federal courts'
power to remedy the effects of school desegregation. Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
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programs, the Court is expanding its own role and limiting that of Congress,
its supposed "co-equal" branch.
As the Court felled the axe on affirmative action programs, it hid behind
the ruse of a color-blind Constitution. As Justice Scalia trumpeted in his
Adarand concurrence, "In the eyes of the government, we are all one race
here. It is American."'59 The original intent behind this doctrine carried far
more wisdom than the shallow dogma that remains today. Justice Harlan, the
sole dissenter in Plessy v. Ferguson, felt strongly that the statute which denied
African-Americans access to the same train cars that carried whites was de-
grading and unconstitutional."6 He wrote:
But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this
country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no
caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens
are equal before the law. 6'
The color-blind Constitution, once a concept embodying fairness and equality,
has become yet another vehicle for oppression by a majority voice.
Lia A. Fazzone
159. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2119 (Scalia, J., concurring).
160. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 562 (1896).
161. Id. at 559.
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